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Main Committee I

Summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 20 May 2005, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Parnohadiningrat ..... (Indonesia)

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

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Mekdad** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States were given rights and responsibilities under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Non-nuclear-weapon States had accepted that arrangement in exchange for guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. Nuclear-weapon States had started to distance themselves from that promise; some had stated that they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The efforts of some of those States to destroy multilateralism and its mechanisms in order to monopolize power and control the destinies of other nations and peoples had worsened the situation. Those same States applied double standards to the non-proliferation issue, thereby increasing the threat to international peace and security.

2. The Treaty had not succeeded in giving the world's peoples a sense of security because nuclear weapons could be used against them at any time. Nuclear-weapon States had stubbornly resisted giving real and legally binding guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. Instead, some nuclear-weapon States had behaved irresponsibly and had regularly violated the Treaty's provisions by assisting States and entities that were not parties to it. In the future, some nuclear-weapon State might not hesitate to put its weapons at the disposal of non-State actors in order to impose terror and chaos on international relations.

3. The resolutions and decisions adopted at previous Review Conferences had become part of the Treaty and should be taken seriously. The extension decided upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had been an extension of the time allowed for pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament, not for possessing nuclear weapons.

4. At the current Review Conference, States should adopt a clear position on the Treaty's universalization and should seriously address the violations committed by some nuclear-weapon States that had transferred nuclear weapons, expertise and assistance to States not parties to the Treaty. One example was Israel, which maintained a huge nuclear arsenal that had been supplied and developed by certain nuclear-weapon States. Those same States had provided Israel with international protection and had justified its defiance of international law.

5. The Conference should also adopt a firm stance on negative security guarantees and call on nuclear-weapon States to put an end to delays, double standards and irresponsibility. All States should adopt a moral policy in accordance with the Treaty's goal of international peace and security without the threat of nuclear weapons.

6. **Mr. Świtalski** (Poland) said that his delegation advocated a balanced approach to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The preservation of the Treaty's integrity and effectiveness was a matter for concern, given the possibility that some States might withdraw from the Treaty or fail to comply with safeguards agreements. In order to enhance international security, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms had been established in the areas of conflict prevention, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and export controls. His Government participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative, launched in May 2003, and had hosted the first anniversary meeting of that Initiative in 2004. His Government also participated in the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and was actively involved in implementing the European Union policy on non-proliferation. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which called on Member States to report on implementation measures, had helped to promote transparency in the area of non-proliferation.

7. The national security interests of States would best be served by the universalization of the Treaty. Multilateralism provided States with the assurance of equal treatment and the opportunity to contribute to common goals. In the post-cold-war era, the Treaty remained the cornerstone of international security. If universally adopted, the model additional protocol would remain an essential non-proliferation tool. The priorities for States included enhancing the capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and strengthening its financing mechanisms, ensuring the accession of all States to the Treaty and promoting the universal implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. States should make every effort to ensure the success of the diplomatic meeting to be held in Vienna from 4 to 8 July 2005 to consider amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. His

delegation advocated the earliest possible ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the initiation of negotiations on the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty.

8. **Ms. Sanders** (United States of America) said that her delegation was fully committed to the Treaty and believed that all States must comply with their obligations thereunder. Her Government fully complied with article VI and was interested in knowing how other States were advancing the goals of that article, which applied to both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. The strengthening of international trust had enabled her Government to undertake measures pursuant to article VI, both multilaterally within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilaterally (with the Russian Federation). However, there were new proliferation challenges, including the violation of non-proliferation agreements by States seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as revelations of non-State actor involvement in the trafficking of nuclear material. Those challenges threatened international peace and security and the viability of the Treaty, and the prime objective of the 2005 Review Conference should be to endorse measures to combat those proliferation threats.

9. Her Government had established an enviable record of article VI compliance by dismantling more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988 and approving a plan to cut the nuclear stockpile by almost half from its 2001 level. Non-strategic nuclear weapon storage sites in Europe had been reduced by 80 per cent and significant reductions in nuclear delivery systems had been effected since the end of the cold war. The United States had not enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 and had not produced plutonium for nuclear weapons since 1988, and had no plans to do so in the future. Her delegation supported the initiation, in the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

10. Since 1992, her Government had allocated more than $9 billion to non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union. Her Government had agreed to contribute half of the $20-billion pledge that had been made by the Group of Eight leaders for threat reduction assistance to the Russian Federation over the next 10 years. Her Government continued to observe a nuclear testing moratorium and encouraged other States to do likewise. It did not support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty but continued to work with the Provisional Technical Secretariat on the international monitoring system. Her Government no longer targeted any country with nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis. Significant steps had been taken to contribute to article VI goals and to confidence-building among States.

11. Following its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, her Government had redefined the role of nuclear weapons in the national defence strategy, in line with its resolve to implement article VI of the Treaty. It had established a new triad of strategic capabilities that placed far less reliance on nuclear weapons and included nuclear and non-nuclear forces, active and passive defences and a research and development infrastructure. Although the Treaty did not prohibit the nuclear-weapon States from modernizing their nuclear forces, her Government was not developing new nuclear weapons. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review had merely identified shortfalls in capabilities where new conventional or nuclear weapons might be required. In that connection, while research on advanced weapon concepts had been carried out, there had been no decision to move beyond the study stage. One of the goals of that research was to ensure that the nuclear stockpile remained safe and reliable. Her Government balanced its obligations under article VI with its obligations to maintain national security.

12. Compliance with all the objectives of the Treaty was very important and should be a shared goal. It was untenable to assert that compliance with non-proliferation obligations was linked to compliance with disarmament obligations, that the non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty were any less binding than the disarmament obligations or that the non-proliferation obligations should not be strengthened or enforced. While the Review Conference served a vital function by facilitating an exchange of views and reaffirming Treaty obligations, it was not an amendment conference. Any declarations or decisions emanating from the Conference did not in any way modify the explicit legal obligations of all States parties to the Treaty.

13. Her delegation believed that many States parties had made little effort to pursue good-faith negotiations on general and complete disarmament under article VI. That aspect of article VI was often overlooked, even though the Treaty clearly implied that efforts towards nuclear disarmament should be linked to efforts towards general and complete disarmament. During the

course of the Review Conference, her delegation would welcome full engagement and discussion on article VI. The excessive focus on nuclear disarmament was diverting attention from the non-proliferation articles of the Treaty and from the crisis of compliance to which that imbalance of attention had contributed.

14. **Mr. Meghlaoui** (Algeria) said that the balanced implementation of the Treaty's three cornerstones of disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a basic condition for its credibility and effectiveness. The 1995 Review Conference had adopted basic principles for nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI, and the 2000 Review Conference had embodied those principles in the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament set out in its Final Document. But no progress had been made in the implementation of those steps or in the area of nuclear disarmament generally. Similarly, the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had not yet entered into force, and there had been no progress in negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. In view of certain military doctrines that incorporated nuclear weapons into their strategy, a legally binding international instrument protecting non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was essential.

15. The natural multilateral cooperative framework within which to address those problems was the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and the lack of progress reflected a lack of political will and a conflict of interests and priorities among States parties to the Treaty. Algeria urged the States parties to build on the "Five Ambassadors'" proposal, which addressed the four basic issues of nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

16. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important transitional step towards comprehensive disarmament. The 1995 Review Conference had adopted a resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, but Israel had obstructed that goal by remaining outside the Treaty and refusing to submit its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards regime. The Conference should adopt the necessary resolutions and recommendations to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty and rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons.

17. Algeria, in the interest of international peace and stability, had acceded to all international instruments relating to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA and expressed its intention to sign an additional protocol.

18. **Mr. Al-Shamsi** (United Arab Emirates) said that the danger of nuclear proliferation was not limited to the nuclear-weapons States' maintenance of their nuclear arsenals, but also included efforts in recent years by other States to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, secretly or openly, as part of national defence strategies dating back to the cold war. Lack of progress towards limiting the spread of offensive strategic nuclear weapons and towards universalization of the Treaty not only eroded trust among nations, but also placed obstacles in the way of peace, security and development in the new millennium.

19. The principle of multilateralism in the disarmament and non-proliferation processes needed to be reaffirmed. That required continued strengthening of the review process, of the regular reporting mechanism provided for by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and of non-proliferation education. Second, mechanisms were needed to ensure compliance by nuclear-weapon States with their commitments to complete disarmament, including implementation of the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, according to a timetable agreed to within a multilateral framework in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. Third, the necessary guarantees should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States, including a legally binding international instrument whereby nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Fourth, the necessary recommendations should be adopted to strengthen the Conference's mandate to deal with the challenges standing in the way of agreement on a phased programme for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Fifth, nations which had not acceded to the Treaty, foremost among them Israel, should be required to do so as soon as possible without preconditions, and to submit their nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards. Sixth, the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be regarded as one of the most important of the 13 practical steps set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

The United Arab Emirates hoped that the deliberations of the current Review Conference would contribute to a safe, secure and stable global environment conducive to sustainable development.

20. **Miss Majali** (Jordan) said that the world was further than ever from realizing the principles and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Large nuclear stockpiles remained, no tangible progress had been made towards nuclear disarmament or towards halting the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the objective of universal adherence to the Treaty was still to be achieved and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had yet to enter into force. The Conference should call for the early adoption of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and negotiations should begin on the drafting of a binding document providing negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

21. The 2005 Review Conference should call upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. The Conference should also call for the total prohibition of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities and a ban on the extension of assistance in the nuclear field to States not parties to the Treaty. It was important to make every effort to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It was necessary for nuclear-weapon States to comply fully with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

22. **Mr. Bauwens** (Belgium), speaking also on behalf of Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey, drew attention to working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.35, in which the seven sponsors had attempted to outline middle-ground positions for consideration at the current Review Conference. The working paper contained language on preserving the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, safeguards and verification, accountability and transparency, fissile material, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, negative security assurances, non-strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The sponsors hoped that the document would serve as an input for the final document of the 2005 Review Conference.

23. **Mr. De Alba** (Mexico) said that, as one of the sponsors of the working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education, Mexico associated itself fully with the statement on that subject made earlier by the representative of New Zealand.

24. A measure of the success of the Treaty was the degree to which nuclear-weapon States fulfilled their unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament, which had been a major achievement of the successive Review Conferences. Unfortunately, the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was perhaps the sole concrete result in that regard. Even that Treaty had shortcomings: it was not irreversible, and compliance was difficult to verify. Mexico had noted that most of the disarmament commitments made by nuclear-weapon States predated the year 2000, and therefore also the unequivocal undertaking made that year.

25. Mexico shared the recent worldwide concern over a number of cases of failure to comply with non-proliferation commitments, as they threatened international peace and security, and hoped that the present Review Conference would address those cases objectively and comprehensively. The Review Conference should also evaluate compliance with all three pillars of the Treaty, and ensure that States Parties' right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy was guaranteed in an environment of strengthened safeguards. Such an evaluation should be based on the wording of the Treaty itself and on the commitments freely entered into at previous Review Conferences.

26. The evaluation of compliance would strengthen, rather than alter, the Treaty, as its effectiveness depended on observing the principle of pacta sunt servanda. An evaluation would make it possible not only to examine past achievements, but also to determine what remained to be done. Mexico favoured regular written reports on compliance, an approach advocated at the 2000 Review Conference as one of 13 practical steps to promote implementation of article VI of the Treaty, and had submitted such a report itself in the interests of improving transparency and easing concerns over non-compliance. It hoped that the opportunity to make progress in disarmament would not be jeopardized by the diverging views on the fulfilment of Treaty undertakings, and would be contributing proposals for more objective compliance yardsticks.

27. Lastly, Mexico supported the working paper submitted by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Timor-Leste and Yemen on the legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.41).

28. **Ms. Hobbs** (New Zealand) said that the important role of civil society in the implementation of the Treaty should be kept in mind. Education in disarmament and non-proliferation was essential for strengthening the links between the Treaty regime and the international community. The full implementation of the Treaty would require active cooperation between Governments and all sectors of civil society.

29. New Zealand had had the honour of being represented in the Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on disarmament and non-proliferation education, which had been set up in 2002 after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 55/33 E, "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education". New Zealand supported the recommendation of the study and urged all States to implement them fully. New Zealand was one of the sponsors of a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30), which recommended steps for the further development of disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. Two representatives of NGOs had been included in the New Zealand delegation to the current Review Conference to strengthen links between Governments and civil society.

30. **Mr. Al-Otaibi** (Kuwait) said that the Treaty was a key instrument in efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for nuclear disarmament, and renewed its call on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their undertaking at the 2000 Review Conference to work for complete disarmament through negotiation and by fully implementing the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament set out in the Final Document of that Conference. Thus far, the desired progress had not been made owing to a lack of political will to comply with international agreements. Out of its concern about the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, Kuwait had ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In the interest of nuclear safety, Kuwait had ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

31. His delegation urged all States that had not yet done so to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with IAEA. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should comply with their obligations thereunder. Kuwait welcomed Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and had submitted its national report to the relevant Committee. It believed that international monitoring mechanisms to ensure non-proliferation should be enhanced. An objective evaluation of nuclear-weapon States' compliance with the Treaty and the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences was essential. The current Conference was a perfect time for States that had not yet done so to announce their intention to accede to the Treaty and work towards a world free of weapons of mass destruction.

32. **Mr. Adekanyen** (Nigeria) said that Nigeria had renounced the nuclear option, concluded safeguards arrangements with IAEA and ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Nigeria had always called on States parties to reaffirm their commitment to the full implementation of the Treaty, especially article VI. That call was in keeping with the international community's resolve, set out in the Millennium Declaration, to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. It was crucial for States parties to agree on the establishment of a legally binding international instrument under which the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. That was the only way that non-proliferation could be meaningfully sustained.

33. Nigeria supported the final document of the 2000 Review Conference and the 13 practical steps set out therein, which would hasten progress towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.

34. Nigeria was concerned at the emergence of new strategic doctrines in some nuclear-weapon States which had raised doubts about the implementation of

important disarmament commitments. Nigeria supported the total elimination of nuclear tests and had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2001.

35. Bilateral efforts by the two major nuclear Powers to reduce strategic nuclear defences represented a positive step towards nuclear disarmament. However, reductions in deployment or operational status were no substitute for irreversible cuts or the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It was necessary to commence negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

36. Appropriate measures should be adopted to preserve the right of all parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under full IAEA safeguards. Nigeria had created or participated in national and regional institutional frameworks in that regard. It supported efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and reaffirmed the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

37. **Ms. Pollack** (Canada) stated Canada's support for the working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30). Canada had fully supported General Assembly resolution 55/33 E, and already had several national measures in place which were in keeping with the recommendations in the resolution, such as support for independent, graduate-level research and sponsorship of the production of an education module on disarmament and non-proliferation for students and teachers at the secondary level.

38. Canada had included representatives of civil society in its delegations to Non-Proliferation Treaty meetings and had held annual conferences with civil society representatives on disarmament and non-proliferation. Canada looked forward to learning about how other parties were advancing the goals of article VI of the Treaty.

39. **Mr. Chowdhury** (Bangladesh) said that the reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to implement article VI of the Treaty was disappointing, as was the fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had not yet entered into force. The posture of some nuclear-weapon States which had prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament was deeply regrettable.

40. Bangladesh had an impeccable non-proliferation record and had opted to remain nuclear-weapon-free. The country attached great importance to full adherence to articles I and II of the Treaty and to the rights of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear non-proliferation was not practically achievable in the absence of total nuclear disarmament. Arrangements concluded outside the Treaty with a view to reducing nuclear arsenals were welcome, as long as they complemented the Treaty and did not attempt to replace it.

41. A major achievement of the 2000 Review Conference had been the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to provide negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. It was important to maintain those assurances as they would encourage States to remain nuclear-weapon-free. It was regrettable that that arrangement had been diluted in recent years.

42. **Mr. Nejad** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that at the end of the cold war, serious attempts had been made to reduce the nuclear threat and a new positive atmosphere had been created. Unfortunately, that trend had been discontinued. A representative of one of the nuclear-weapon States had recently said that article VI of the Treaty did not refer to nuclear-weapon States and that there were no deadlines for nuclear disarmament. Some new policies adopted by nuclear-weapon States ran counter to the obligations undertaken by those States under the Treaty. Such policies included the possibility of targeting non-nuclear-weapon States or developing new warheads.

43. Israel's nuclear arsenal was a threat to the Middle East region. Cooperation extended to Israel had increased its nuclear weapon capability and was in violation of the Treaty. Such transfers, deployments and training posed serious threats.

44. **Ms. Notutelan** (South Africa) said that the International Maritime Organization had recently concluded negotiations on proposed amendments to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its Protocol relating to fixed platforms. That development could have negative implications for the implementation of States parties' obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A diplomatic conference to

adopt the proposed amendments to the 1988 Convention and Protocol was scheduled for October 2005.

45. The most controversial aspect of the proposed amendments was a so-called savings clause specifying that it would not be an offence under the Convention to transport items or materials intended for the delivery system of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, where the holding of such weapon or device was not contrary to that State party's obligations under the Treaty. The proposed amendments were in direct conflict with South Africa's policy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which reflected its obligations under articles II and III of the Treaty. If the provisions in question were not brought into line with the Treaty, South Africa would not be able to become a party to the amended instrument.

46. Not only was the savings clause contrary to articles I and II of the Treaty, which prohibited the transfer or receipt of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices; it also sought to reinterpret States parties' obligations under the Treaty and had the effect of further entrenching the unequal legal regime for nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty, contrary to their disarmament obligations. If adopted, some of the provisions might affect States' right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

47. South Africa had requested that the proposed amendments should include language consistent with article 4, paragraph 4, of the recently adopted International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which read, "This Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States". Moreover, in view of its concerns about attempts to reinterpret the Treaty and to adopt measures contrary to its provisions in other international bodies not responsible for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, South Africa proposed that the final document of the Conference should include a sentence reading, "States parties reaffirm their commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to their obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty and undertake not to effect the transfer to any recipient, or to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever, of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or their parts, control over such weapons, parts or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, their parts or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons, parts or explosive devices".

48. **Mr. Al-Bader** (Qatar) said that Qatar considered the Treaty the cornerstone of regional and international peace and security and believed that universalization of the Treaty was within reach if appropriate pressures were applied to the three States that had not yet signed it. Qatar called on nuclear-weapon States to give up their reliance on nuclear deterrence, in implementation of article VI, and for non-nuclear-weapon States to be given the requisite safeguards. Qatar called on Israel, the only State in the Middle East not to have signed the Treaty and the only obstacle in the way of implementing General Assembly resolution 59/63 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, to accede to the Treaty and submit its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards regime. Transparent and non-discriminatory implementation and the provision of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States were crucial to the Treaty's success.

49. **Mr. Journès** (France) said, with respect to the working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30), that anything that could spread awareness of the stakes and the challenges of non-proliferation was a step in the right direction. Such awareness-raising activities should target young people, civil society and the research and academic community working on related subjects. France was in full agreement with the working paper's recommendations, although the reference to visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been the subject of a separate paragraph. Furthermore, there remained the question of funding: who would actually pay for all those worthwhile activities?

50. **Mr. Köffler** (Austria) said that the oft-cited "crisis of compliance" with the Treaty had two components: the disarmament side and the non-proliferation side. The two sides were equally important and mutually reinforcing, and one could not be held hostage to the other. A new dimension was the twin issue of terrorism and non-State actors. If the Treaty was in a crisis of confidence alongside its crisis of compliance, efforts should be made to restore trust among its States parties.

51. Significant progress had been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their state of alert and deployment. However, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, which had been on the agenda for years, needed to be resolved. Despite the progress made, it was regrettable that nuclear weapons still had a place, sometimes a central place, in strategic planning and military doctrines. Austria was also concerned about reports of intentions to develop new nuclear weapons from existing ones or to alter their design for new uses. The assertion that such plans were only at the theoretical stage was not very reassuring. The cold-war concept of nuclear deterrence was still in use long after the end of the cold war, but the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence against non-State actors, to give just one example, was highly doubtful.

52. The common goal of the States parties to the Treaty — the vision of a safer world free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction — had been expressed by consensus both in the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 Review Conference and in the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Conference. Those commitments by States parties remained as valid as ever, and Austria fully subscribed to the three concepts put forward by the countries of the New Agenda Coalition — irreversibility, transparency and verification — as the basis of the non-proliferation process.

53. The almost universal support for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a major factor in efforts to build a world of peace and security. Austria called upon all States that had not yet done so, especially those listed in annex 2 to that Treaty, to sign and ratify it without delay. With regard to the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty, there was also widespread support for commencing negotiations without preconditions. Austria favoured a non-discriminatory, universally applicable and verifiable treaty. In addition, the IAEA safeguards system needed to be strengthened. Safeguards agreements should be supplemented with additional protocols, and acceptance of such additional protocols should be made a condition of supply for all exports of nuclear material and technology.

54. In the context of nuclear safety, States should be urged to make every effort to ensure the positive outcome of the diplomatic conference for the adoption amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Austria noted with interest the report of the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and looked forward to discussing the Group's recommendations, which could provide an important complement to existing non-proliferation regimes and measures.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.